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Abstract 
 
Research in the domain of Financial Contagion has 
come to the forefront in recent years. There has been a 
significant focus on this field since the recession of 
2008. In this paper we take a look at simulation based 
modelling to stress test the stability of inter-bank loan 
networks of different structures. We look to analyze the 
effect of various parameters on the stability of these 
networks. We first simulate networks which are 
Homogeneous in nature. We then simulate a 
Heterogeneous (tiered) network. The model also 
introduces an endogenous loaning mechanism to 
imitate a more realistic inter bank loan market. We run 
simulations on these networks to gain a better 
understanding of the propagation of losses through the 
network. After studying the results of these simulations 
we come up with some interesting new insights about 
how parameters like connectivity and size of the 
network, effect a tiered intra-bank financial network. 
One of our key findings is that higher inter-tier 
connectivity is good for the stability of big banks but 
not so much for banks of smaller size. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The recent global recession of 2008 was a global 
disaster. It led to losses in the home equity network 
that transpired to huge losses being incurred in the 
stock network. According to Business Insider, the 
United States of America lost more than 10 Trillion 
dollars in the crash [19]. According to The Guardian, 
the crash in network also led to more than 500 banks 
declaring bankruptcy and a considerably higher 
number of banks suffered considerable losses, in the 
subsequent years [20]. Modern day financial 
institutions are interlinked between each other. The 
failure of one institution affects the financial health of 
others. This is depicted by common “Too Big to Fail” 
phrase [21] which indicates there are certain big 
financial institutions that can’t be allowed to fail. The 
failure of these banks will lead to catastrophic failure 
of the overall financial systems. However, though there 
is an agreement that there are few banks that are too 
large and too risky to fail, there has not been much 
research or study on how big is too big. There is scant 
understanding of the impact of various characteristics  
 
of financial networks that may affect the stability of the 
network. In light of this tragedy, the study of systemic 
risk in financial Networks has come to the forefront of 
research. Acemoglu et al [3] have studied this aspect 
through an analytical way. They have mathematically 
modeled the financial network and have identified 
several properties and characteristics for stability of the 
financial network.  
 
Though mathematical modeling is important for 
deriving theoretical insights, it is limited by the 
assumptions that are needed to make a mathematical 
model fit to a real life scenario. To address more 
realistic situation, in this paper we use simulation 
based network modeling to identify scenarios where 
failure of one or few banks can lead to failure of the 
overall system. Through simulation based approach we 
determine, how Failure of one individual bank in a 
financial network can cause a cascade of failures 
throughout the system. We take a network model 
approach [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] to do this simulation. In this 
research we focus on the financial sector, specifically 
interbank loan networks.  
 
First we simulate the interbank loan network through a 
simulation of a network of nodes. Next, to do stress 
test of the network, we simulate shocks which can 
assess the stability of the network based on certain 
parameters. A concept known as contagion is 
introduced which affects the whole network of nodes, 
instead of just one bank. The banks have dependencies 
on the other banks when they either borrow money or 
lend money to other banks. Such cases are also handled 
in this model of banking. Let us consider an example 
of a bank which goes bankrupt and crossed the limits 
of capital. The loans it has got have exceeded the limits 
and it cannot repay the loan amount now. In such 
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cases, the lending banks would be losing the money 
and their net capital (assets) should be updated 
accordingly. If a bank’s asset becomes lower than its 
liabilities, we say it has defaulted and remove it from 
the network. However, removal of one bank from the 
financial system leads to loss of the loan given to the 
removed bank by all other banks in the system. This 
leads to propagation of financial loss through the 
network and may lead to failure (or removal) of more 
banks from the system. As the number of banks failing 
due to such a domino effect increases, more unstable 
the financial network becomes.  
 
In this research we investigate the stability of this 
interbank loan network against certain parameters – 
number of banks, their internal connectivity and the 
severity of a shock. We measure the stability by the 
metric of how many nodes and how much residual 
capital survives in the aftermath of the shock. We also 
analyze a tiered banking network structure with an 
endogenous loaning mechanism, where the decision of 
granting an interbank loan is not random but is based 
on risk and return of the loan.   
 
This research is fundamental to the kind of research 
being sought after by Central Banks around the world 
[11][12]. At the junction of financial crisis, the output 
of this research can be used by central banks to 
determine when and how to intervene. For example, 
whether the central bank should let a bank fail or 
should it intervene – this question has wide political 
and economic implications. However, seldom that 
decision is driven by evidence based research. This 
research aims to close that particular gap.  
 
Some of the specific contributions of this paper are to 
run simulations on tiered networks resembling the real 
world inter bank loan markets and see how 
connectivity and size of the network along with the 
intensity of the shocking mechanism effect the stability 
of such a tiered structure. We analyze in detail the 
effect of such parameters on each individual tier of the 
said banking network.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows in section 
2 we discuss the Related Works to this kind of 
research. In section 3 we describe in detail the model 
and define the key terminologies that have been used in 
the paper. Here we also describe the various methods 
used in the model like the shocking mechanism, the 
endogenous loaning mechanism and how losses 
propagate in the system. In section 4, we discuss about 
the metrics used and analyze the results achieved after 
running simulations. This is followed by Conclusions. 
2. Related Work 
The way we look at the problem is very similar to the 
way a disease spreads through a population where the 
infection can be transmitted from one person to another 
upon contact [13] [14]. This is where the name 
contagion is derived from. This approach of 
determining the stability of a network or propagation 
of a shock has been studied in various other disciplines 
like Biology [13] [14], Economics [15] [17], 
Psychology [16] and Sociology [18] among many 
others.   
 
Even though the interest in contagion has seen 
significant spike in recent years due to the global crisis, 
it is not a new topic, Diamond and Dybvig [22] came 
up with a model for bank runs and related financial 
crises way back in 1983.  There was also considerable 
research done in the field after the Mexican Peso crisis 
of 1994 and the Asian Network crash of 1997 [23][24]. 
However the domain really came to the forefront with 
the influential paper by Allen and Gale [17] where they 
analyzed the fragility of a given network system based 
on its structure by making use of simple examples. 
There has been a lot of theoretical research done in the 
study of contagion [3] [4] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10], but there 
is a lack of empirical research of the field. This lack of 
empirical research has been a problem for central 
banks and regulators. Many central banks around the 
world have conducted research that looks to address 
this issue [11] [12] [8]. However as the data required 
for this kind of research is proprietary in nature, 
research outside of institutions with available data, 
need to resort to simulations. This has led to the use of 
simulations to study the effect stability of network of 
financial institutions in case of instability of one or few 
banks in the network.  
 
Nier et al [5] were one of the first to use simulation 
methods to analyze the interbank loan networks. This 
work, in turn, has greatly inspired a lot of further 
research in this domain. The use of Eboli model which 
equates the default dynamics of the interbank loan 
networks to flow networks in physics, led to this work 
being emulated and improved on further by multiple 
papers. One such paper being Dasgupta et al [1] who 
use simulations to come up with a contagion index 
combining various characteristics of similar network 
models as of [5]. Upper [2] in 2011 used simulations to 
validate the results and compare the various models 
used by different papers; this paper showcases how 
simulations can be used to visualize the loan networks 
as networks or graphs and how it can be a powerful 
tool for analyzing interbank loan networks.   
 
However, most of these simulations have been run on 
Homogeneous networks, networks where all nodes and 
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edges are of equal importance/strength. There has been 
few studies with a two tiered network structure [1] [2] 
[5] [6] [7] [9], where nodes are identical to nodes in its 
own tier but differ from nodes of the other layer. Also 
the edge weights vary leading to this structure being 
very different from the Homogeneous one. Many have 
argued that even though the results achieved in a 
homogeneous network may work in an ideal world, the 
complexity of the real world problems can be 
represented by adding Heterogeneity to the said 
networks. So, [1] and [5] delve into heterogeneity by 
running simulations on a two tiered alpha-beta 
heterogeneous network, [7] investigates the existence 
of dense cores in a heterogeneous network of banks. In 
this paper we extend this work by running simulations 
on a three tiered structure, with heterogeneity among 
nodes in each layer. We emulate a real work bank 
lending network by introducing a third tier which shall 
resemble the sector specific financial institutions (such 
as mutual fund or other financial derivatives of various 
sectors). Here the tier 1 bank is the ‘Big’ banks, so they 
will have a considerably large amount of assets 
whereas second tier banks will be relatively smaller in 
size. The tier 3 will refer to sectors and they represent a 
collection of loanees pertaining to specific domains. So 
for example Real Estate can be regarded as a sector. 
None of the banks will be identical to each other. We 
first validate the results achieved for Homogeneous 
structures and compare them to results obtained by [1] 
[2] and [5]. We then show that similar relationships 
can be observed for a more complex three tiered 
structure as well and derive few more useful insights. 
 
3. Model and Method 
In this section we describe the model and the approach 
in simulating the interbank loan networks. We 
represent each entity in the interbank loan networks 
(such as a bank) as a node in a directed graph. So G = 
(V, E) is the network representation of interbank loan 
network. V is the set of all nodes in the network, where 
each node represents a financial institution (banks) that 
takes part in the interbank loan. An edge 
 is a directional 
edge from  to  represents a loan given by node  
to node . Each node has one important characteristic, 
weight (called node weight) which represents the cash 
in hand with that node (financial institution). Each 
edge has also a weight, which represent the current 
loan amount from node  to . 
 
To model the interbank loan network we first assume 
the interbank loan networks as a network of nodes and 
edges. We allocate node weights to all the nodes and 
edge weights to all the edges, once that is done we sum 
up all the node weights to get the total net capital of the 
network and denote it by N. Similarly we sum up all 
the edge weights to get the total lending or borrowing 
in the network and denote it by E. The ratio of these 
two play an important role as we will see later and we 
denote it as the N/E ratio.  
Before describing the details of the loan network, 
below we first describe few concepts.  
 
Systematic Risk: Systemic risk led to financial crisis in 
2008. It is a problem in banking, where an isolated 
event triggers instability or collapse of the whole 
system. In a banking network, due to a lot of 
dependencies, if one of the banks fail, there may be a 
chance of cascading failure, so losses can propagate to 
all the other banks in the chain. Systemic risk is a 
major concern for central banks, in safeguarding the 
whole financial stability. It occurs, if some of the banks 
in the network have high potential to fail and indirectly 
impose the same onto the whole economy. We check 
for systemic risk in our simulated network by 
providing shock to the system and removing banks 
which default. 
 
Each node in the simulated interbank loan financial 
network is a bank or financial entity that can borrow or 
lend money in the lending network. Below we define 
some common financial terminologies that are used to 
denote the health of a bank. These characteristics will 
be associated with each node in our model and will be 
used to determine the health of the node.  
 
Balance sheets, Assets, Liabilities, Capital: Balance 
sheet is a report which shows the bank’s assets, 
liabilities and the equity share of all the owners [25]. 
An asset has a value which can be converted to cash by 
selling those [25].  
Liability is an obligation that must eventually be paid 
as it is a claim on assets [25]. The owner’s equity in a 
bank is often referred to as bank capital [25]. We can 
quote these as an equation [25], 
  
Assets = Liabilities + Capital 
 
Shock: Now in this model similar to [1] [5] we 
introduce an external shocking mechanism. This 
mechanism has two important characteristics. First, 
across how many banks, such shock is introduced and 
second, if a bank is effected how much of its capital 
does it lose. The second parameter can be regarded as 
the severity of the shock, denoted by φ, whereas the 
first feature is deemed as the reach of the shock, 
denoted by χ. If a bank is hit by a shock, we calculate 
its remaining capital by the following equation: 
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Remaining capital = (1- φ)*(Assets) 
 
The remaining capital definition comes in handy to 
ascertain when a bank fails in our model. Given an 
external shock or a hit we will deem a bank to be 
bankrupt or fail when its remaining capital becomes 
less than its liabilities. Once a bank fails, we remove it 
from the network, and the loans given to that failed 
bank from other banks are deducted from their 
respective assets. So this causes them to lose money 
and thus the initial shock causes losses to propagate 
throughout the entire network. This continues 
iteratively till there is no more bank in the system 
whose remaining capital is less than its liabilities.  
The interbank loan network can follow two different 
structures which we are going to discuss next. 
 
Homogeneous Inter Bank Loan Network 
In this kind of network each node (bank) is identical to 
all the other nodes in the system and each edge is 
identical to all the other edges in the Network. So, all 
the node weights will be equal to each other and all 
edge weights will be equal to each other. These types 
of networks represent those scenarios where all 
commodities in the system are equal to each other, they 
are assumed to be of the nature of Erdos Renyi graphs 
[1]. Though the homogenous assumption is not 
realistic, due to reduced complexities most existing 
research [1] [5] [7] on interbank loan network assumes 
homogeneous network. Such assumptions make the 
model analytically trackable. To make our research 
continuation from the past research, we first study the 
simulation based analysis on homogenous network to 
establish the results based on existing research.  
 
In this structure all banks will have the same net 
capital, so if the total net capital of the network is 
denoted as N and there are n banks, each bank thus, 
will have a capital of . Similarly if the total value 
of the loan network (the amount that has been given 
loan by one bank to another bank) is given as E and 
there are m interbank loans (i.e. edges), each edge in 
the homogeneous network will have an edge weight of 
.  
 
In our simulation of homogenous interbank loan 
network, a χ fraction of banks will be hit by a shock, 
where each of the banks will lose ϕ fraction of their 
assets. If the remaining capital of any bank is less than 
its liabilities, we will deem it to be bankrupt. After the 
initial shock we will see how many of the banks 
default and we will observe how much loss they 
propagate to banks who had lent them money. So this 
phenomenon takes in the form of a contagion and we 
observe how losses propagate throughout the network 
causing knock-on defaults. The number of surviving 
nodes after the network has stabilized is deemed to be 
the stability factor, and this is what we analyze as a 
measure while running our simulations. We will 
discuss the results in the next section. Next, we 
introduce more complex Heterogeneous interbank loan 
networks. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Heterogeneous Inter Bank Loan Network 
To model the more realistic situation where both banks 
and loans are of varied size, we resort to heterogeneous 
network. Here, each edge and node in the network has 
individual values, which are unequal. As such 
heterogeneous networks are difficult to track 
analytically, existing research in this domain has not 
dealt with this kind of network in great detail. Even in 
existing research, where heterogeneous networks have 
been discussed [1][5], they  assume α-β heterogeneity. 
α-β heterogeneity refers to the structure where α 
fraction of banks have β fraction of the assets, 
generally for more heterogeneity α is close to 0, like 
0.05 and β is closer to 1, say 0.9.   In this research we 
will not make any such assumptions about the loan 
network. Here, with the help of simulation we plan to 
analyze the stability of an endogenous heterogeneous 
interbank loan network – which is the key contribution 
of this paper.  
 
In our model we will not have the α-β heterogeneity. 
We will simply allocate Tier1 banks to be big banks 
with a very high amount of assets (e.g. JP Morgan 
Chase) and similarly the Tier 2 banks (e.g. any 
community bank) to have a considerably lower amount 
of assets. Tier 1 and tier 2 banks invest money in the 
third tier which are the various sector specific financial 
institutions to make money, as depicted by the figure 
below. We allow tier 2 banks to take loans from tier 1 
banks so that they can have more capital to invest in 
the network sectors. Unlike in homogeneous structure, 
here we have a rate of return associated with each loan. 
For each dollar a tier 1 bank loans to a tier 2 bank, it 
has to return r dollars, where r > 1, the exact value of r 
varies from loan to loan (i.e. for different edges). 
Similarly the loan to a sector has a rate of return R 
which vary from loan to loan, but we always have R > 
r > 1, for all R and r. Also there is a time paradigm in 
our model, it is built in a way that each loan from tier 1 
to tier 2 needs to be repaid in 2 time stamps, whereas 
each loan to tier 3 gets repaid within the next time 
stamp itself. This is done so that the lower level banks 
can maximize each loan. Also, there is a risk of failure 
associated with investing in a sector. Typically as the 
rate of return of loan in a sector increases the risk of 
failure of returning on the loan increases too. 
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These loans and investments are not done randomly 
but there is an endogenous decision making involved. 
Suppose a tier 1 bank does not wish to invest in a 
certain sector due to past losses, then it will not loan to 
tier 2 banks which invest money in that particular 
sector. Also a tier 2 bank which is financially sound 
will seek to invest in sectors which have a lower risk of 
failure, whereas a bank which is struggling financially, 
may choose to take greater risks to make sure they do 
not go under and is able to repay all the money it has 
borrowed. So each loan granted or each investment 
made during the simulations is not completely random 
in nature but follows these realistic constraints.  
   
 
Figure 1 A sample 3-tiered Heterogeneous Network 
 
In simulating heterogeneous network, we introduce the 
external shock similar to homogeneous network, but 
instead of hitting banks with shocks, here the sectors 
are targeted. If a sector is hit by a shock, all banks who 
had invested money in that particular sector, lose the 
money invested. Once the initial shock is setup we 
iteratively check if any of the banks default or not, if so 
how many of the banks go bankrupt and then analyze 
how much losses they propagate to banks who had lent 
these money.  
In our heterogeneous network simulations, we observe 
the number of surviving nodes in each tier along with 
the total amount of money left in the system. We do 
this because we believe the amount of the money left 
in the network is a better representative of the state of 
the network. So we run our simulations to check both 
the number of surviving nodes as well the leftover 
amount of money to analyze our results. 
 
4. Results and Discussions 
 
In this section we describe the results obtained by our 
simulated experiments.  
 
Metrics Used 
To describe the current condition of the system, we 
focus primarily on two metrics.  
Number of surviving nodes: This is the metric which 
has been chosen repeatedly in the past as well [1] [2] 
[5]. The objective of this study is to analyze the 
stability of the network. It is a good measure to see 
how many of the initial nodes, survived the contagion. 
We reported this result for both the homogenous and 
heterogeneous networks.  
Percentage of money left in the system: In 
heterogeneous network where the asset of each bank is 
not equal, this is an important metric. For example, if 
30 out of 100 banks survive the contagion, but in total 
they have only 30 dollars left as asset – that’s not a 
good indication of the stability of the network. So we 
use the percentage amount left in the system 
(computed as sum of assets left over for all the 
surviving nodes) compared to the total amount in the 
system before the shock as a metric for stability of the 
network. 
 
Results 
The simulations we run, generate plots which help us 
interpret how each parameter affects the stability of the 
network. Each simulation run, we do, will vary a 
selected parameter, over a range of values as given in 
Table 1 and Table 2, while keeping all others constant 
at the benchmark values. The values that have been 
chosen as parameter ranges are based on past research 
done in this domain. They are inspired from the work 
done by Dasgupta et al. [1], Nier et al.[5] and 
Upper[2]. For each result we run a 100 simulations and 
then average our findings. These experiments will help 
us to understand how the parameters being examined 
influences the stability of the network and whether or 
not should be a factor to be monitored while 
investigating systemic risk. 
Another interesting aspect is the ratio of the total asset 
with the total money being loaned/borrowed in the 
network. This is denoted by N/E ratio and is computed 
as sum of the node weights to the sum of the edge 
weights. We observe the effect of N/E ratio across all 
the simulations we run. For each of these parameters 
that we are examining we plot multiple times with 
different values of the N/E ratio.  
 
Homogeneous Network 
Here in each experiment we introduce shock with χ 
reach and φ severity.  We observe how that translates 
into banks getting bankrupt either with directly being 
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shocked or indirectly through losses propagating from 
bankrupt banks in the network. This continues until the 
network becomes stable, that is there are no more 
banks going bankrupt. The number of surviving banks 
after the network stabilizes is what we are measuring to 
denote the stability of the network.  
Effect of Connectivity: In this experiment we look at 
the effect of connectivity over the stability of the 
network. So here we vary the probability of forming a 
link (i.e. a bank has provided loan to another bank in 
the network) between two nodes from 0.05 to 0.95, 
while keeping all other parameters at the benchmark 
value.  
In Figure 2, we plot the number of solvent banks 
(nodes) as the edge probability increases. From Figure 
2, we see that with increased connectivity, number of 
surviving nodes after the shock stabilizes increases, 
making the network more stable. This result 
demonstrates that for a network, higher connectivity is 
better. Banks, the more they are connected with other 
banks, tend to be more stable as any loss coming in is 
shared by a number of banks and helps in reducing the 
effect of the shock.  
 
 
Conclusion 1: Higher connectivity in the network in 
an interbank loan network, increases the stability of 
the network. Thus banks should loan to multiple other 
banks to increase their stability. 
Also the effect of N/E ratio is also quite clear. With a 
high N/E ratio, the network is more stable even at low 
values of connectivity. 
 
Conclusion 2: Banks should keep higher N/E ratio. 
Thus the banks should be careful about how much 
money they lend compared to the total assets they 
have. 
The first conclusion encourages the diversification, 
which is quite well known in financial market. The 
second asks the bank to increase the reserve they have. 
After the 2008 financial crisis the banks have increased 
their reserve [26].  The above conclusion and simulated 
demonstration support that action. 
 
 
Table 1: Simulation Parameters for Homogeneous Network 
Name of the 
parameter(Variable) 
Description Values / Range Benchmark 
value 
Value 
Distribution 
Node total Total assets in the network 400M, 800M, 1200M           
Edge total Total amount of loans in the network 800M            
Node weight Asset of individual bank (10M, 40M)  Uniform 
Edge weight Amount of the total loan from one bank (origin node) 
to another bank (destination node)  
(1M, 15M)  Uniform 
N/E ratio The ratio of the Node total to the Edge total.  0.5, 1.0, 1.5 1.0  
Number of nodes Number of banks/financial institutions [10, 100] 30 Uniform 
increments of 5 
Connectivity of the 
network 
Probability of forming a directed link between any two 
nodes (i.e. probability that a loan exists from one bank 
to another bank) 
[0.05, 0.95] 0.5 Uniform 
increments of 
0.05 
Φ Severity of the shock 
(percentage of a bank’s asset wiped out by the shock) 
[0.05, 0.95] 0.95 Uniform 
increments of 
0.05 
Χ Reach of the shock (% of banks affected by shock) [0.5, 1]  Uniform 
 
Table 2: Simulation Parameters for Heterogeneous Network 
Name of the 
parameter(Variable) 
Description Values / Range Benchmark Distribution 
n1 Number of banks in tier1 8, 30, 50 30  
n2 Number of banks in tier2 10, 50, 80 50  
n3 Number of nodes in tier 3 4, 6, 15 6  
Asset Range1  Range of Assets of Tier 1 [10000, 14000]  Uniform 
Asset Range2 Range of Assets of Tier 2 [1000 , 8000]  Uniform 
Loan Range 1 Range of total loans from 
tier1 to tier 2 
[10000, 13000]  Uniform 
Loan Range2 Range of total loans from 
tier 2 to sectors 
[6000, 8000]  Uniform 
Χ Fraction of sectors 
shocked 
(0.05,0.95) 0.5 Increments of 0.05 
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Inter-Tier connectivity Number of Tier 2 banks a 
T1 bank is connected to 
5, 25, 50 6  
Rate of return Return for each dollar you 
invest in a sector 
(1.05 → 2.0)  Uniform 
Risk of failure This is the probability, that 
a sector will fail and the 
money invested in it will 
be lost 
(0.05 → 0.8)  Uniform (higher rate of 
return is associated with 
higher risk of failure) 
 
Figure 2: Effect of Network Connectivity in homogenous network 
 
Figure 3: Effect of Number of banks in Homogenous 
network
 
Figure 4: Effect of severity of shock in Homogeneous network 
 
In Figure 3, we look at the effect that number of banks 
has on its stability. Here we see that with increased size 
(i.e. increased number of banks in the network), the 
financial loan market network becomes more stable. 
We also observe that with higher N/E ratio more nodes 
survive the shock thus making the network more 
stable, this supports conclusion 2 above.  
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Conclusion 3: More banks should be created and 
made part of the overall loan network. With increased 
number of financial institutions the stability of the 
overall network increases as depicted by the higher 
number percentage of surviving nodes after the shock. 
In Figure 4, we investigate the stability of the network 
as the severity of shock is increased. Figure 4 plots 
percentage of surviving nodes as the severity of the 
shock increases. We observe though at low severity of 
shock the stability of the network remains (i.e. 
percentage of surviving node) same, at higher severity 
the stability of the network decreases drastically. We 
also note that as the N/E ratio increases, the decrement 
in the percentage of surviving node starts at much 
higher severity of shock, indicating higher stability of 
the network with higher N/E value. 
  
Conclusion 4: Higher severity of shock leads to much 
severe damage to banking network.  
The simulation on homogenous network led us to 
known facts – which validated our approach. Next, we 
describe the simulation of heterogeneous network 
which revealed some interesting new insights.  
 
Heterogeneous Networks 
In heterogeneous network simulations, we determine 
the stability of the network at various severity of the 
shock as the size of the network is varied and as the 
connectivity of the network is varied.  
Each node in the heterogeneous network has different 
asset amount. The loan amount between various banks 
is also different. So in heterogeneous network we use 
the residual value of the total capital (as percentage of 
the initial total capital in the network) as the metric for 
network stability in heterogeneous network.  
 
Figure 5: Effect of connectivity in a Heterogeneous Network 
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Figure 6: Effect of Size in a Heterogeneous Network 
 
In Figure 5, we plot the residual capital as the severity 
of the shock is varied. We plot this for three different 
values of inter-tier connectivity (how many Tier 2 
banks are connected to one Tier 1 bank) – 5, 25 and 50.  
In general for all the graphs as the severity of the shock 
increases the residual capital decreases too – which is 
expected. It is to be noted that at low connectivity 
(Inter-tier connectivity = 5), as the severity of shock 
increases the decrement in residual capital for Tier 1 
bank is drastic (from 77% to 38%). At low 
connectivity, if Tier 2 banks fails, due to low 
connectivity between Tier 1 and Tier 2, the failure is 
easily propagated to Tier 1 banks and Tier 1 banks get 
affected.  
However, as the connectivity increases (Inter-tier 
connectivity = 50), with the increase in severity of 
shock, the decrement in residual capital for Tier 1 bank 
is little (79% to  70%), whereas the decrement in 
residual capital for Tier 2 bank is drastic from 20% to 
4%. As the Tier 1 bank holds the majority of the 
capital in the market, the higher inter-tier connectivity 
reduces the overall reduction of capital due to shock.  
Thus for more stability of the system higher inter-tier 
connectivity between tier 1 and tier 2 is preferred. With 
higher inter-tier connectivity Tier 1 banks loan to 
multiple small Tier 2 banks. So if few of the Tier 2 
banks fail due to wrong investment in Tier 3 sectors, 
the impact on Tier 1 will be much less. 
 
Conclusion 5: Higher inter-tier connectivity leads to 
better stability at Tier 1 (big) banks but lower stability 
at the Tier 2 (small) banks.  
Based on conclusion 5, the central authority should 
encourage big banks to lend to multiple small banks 
(not few selective small banks) to increase the stability 
of the financial loan market. 
 
In Figure 6 we look at the effect of size of the network 
on its stability in heterogeneous network. We combine 
different pairs of values for the Tier 1 and Tier 2 banks 
to get the effect of size of the network to its stability. 
The different combination of values chosen as (Tier 1, 
Tier 2) are [Small = (8, 10), Medium = (30, 50), Large 
= (50, 80)]. As can be seen from Figure 6, in case of 
small network size, the remaining capital decreases 
drastically from 90% to 50% in case of Tier 1 and 65% 
to 8% in case of Tier 2, as the severity of shock is 
increased from 0 to 0.95. With the increased size 
(medium and large network), the remaining capital 
decreases, but not that dramatically for both Tier 1 and 
Tier 2. Also, to note that the reduction of capital 
remaining with the increase of severity of shock in case 
of medium and large network are very similar. This 
indicates that the benefit of increased network size in 
the stability of the network is limited up to certain size 
of the network. After which the benefit saturates. 
 
Conclusion 6: Increasing the size of the network in 
both Tier 1 and Tier 2, in case of heterogeneous 
network increases the stability of the network. 
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However the increase is not linear. The benefit of 
increased size saturates.  
Based on conclusion 6, the central banks should 
encourage higher number of both big banks and small 
banks in the system than very few “too big to fail” 
banks to increase the stability of the financial loan 
market.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we discussed how different parameters of 
the network effect the stability of network with 
different structures. The paper first analyzes and shows 
the effect of certain parameters on a Homogeneous 
network which give us some results which are of more 
intuitive nature. Then we introduce a tiered network 
with endogenous loaning mechanism, where we get 
few interesting results. (1) How increasing the size and 
connectivity of the tiered network brings more stability 
to the upper tier, whereas being not so beneficial to the 
lower one, in this setting, is one of the major 
contributions of this work. (2) Also seeing that size of 
the network after a certain threshold does not improve 
stability is another interesting finding of this study. 
  
The results we observed are also in accordance to 
Business Insider [19] and Guardian [20], where it was 
noticed that more than 500 banks crashed and more 
than 10 trillion dollars were lost during the recession of 
2008. Out of these 500 banks may be 10-15 can be 
classified as top or mid-tier banks, but the rest tended 
to be smaller in nature. So it can be assessed that the 
lower tier banks lost significantly more money than the 
corresponding top tiered banks. Our other result, that 
the network size has an effect only till a threshold 
value also supports and augments the findings of the 
Bloomberg article “Too Big to Fail”[21].  
In future we would like to extend our work by working 
on an endogenous mechanism which given a network 
would work towards a state with maximum stability.     
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